An architecture is presented for combining rule-based and case-based reasoning. The architecture is intended for domains that are understood reasonably well, but still imperfectly. It uses a set of rules, which are taken to be only approximately correct, to obtain a preliminary answer for a given problem; it then draws analogies from cases to handle exceptions to the rules. Having rules together with cases not only increases the architectureś domain coverage, it also allows innovative ways of doing case-based reasoning: the same rules that are used for rule-based reasoning are also used by the case-based component to do case indexing and case adaptation. The architecture was applied to the task of name pronunciation, and, with minimal knowledge engineering, was found to perform almost at the level of the best commercial systems. Moreover, its accuracy was found to exceed what it could have achieved with rules or cases alone, thus demonstrating the accuracy improvement afforded by combining rule-based and case-based reasoning.
Introduction
Domains vary in the degree to which they are understood, ranging from those that have been codi ed completely and correctly in terms of a set of rules of behavior, to those for which n o s u c h rules are known. This paper is concerned with domains that fall between these two extremes, but closer to the well understood" end | domains for which a set of rules is known, but the rules do not cover the full complexities of the domain. The rules must also be able to be run e ciently. In such domains, rules and cases both provide valuable knowledge. While the rules embody the understanding that has been codi ed over the years by experts, cases contain knowledge of the domain in a more unprocessed form | illustrations of actual behaviors that occur in the domain, complete with idiosyncrasies and irregularities. Neither source subsumes the other | the codi ed knowledge in the rules is not necessarily well-represented by a n y given set of cases, while the idiosyncratic knowledge in the cases is not necessarily captured by known rules. This observation is the basis for the architecture presented here for combining rule-based reasoning RBR Hayes-Roth et al., 1983 and case-based reasoning CBR Kolodner, 1993; Riesbeck and Schank, 1989 . The architecture uses a set of rules, which are taken to be only approximately correct, to obtain a preliminary answer for a given problem; it then draws analogies from cases to handle exceptions to the rules.
Having rules together with the cases not only allows the architecture to take advantage of more domain knowledge, it also allows innovations in CBR technology. The architecture incorporates two novel methods for CBR that are based on exploiting the rules of the RBR component. First, the rules are used to index the cases. The indexing scheme, termed prediction-based indexing, hangs cases directly o the rules, using the rule antecedents to supply appropriate cues for case retrieval. This avoids having to analyze the domain to identify a suitable vocabulary of direct and derived indexing features; instead, it takes advantage of the domain structure implicit in the rules, and hence already available. The second role of the rules in CBR is for case adaptation, via a strategy of case adaptation by factoring". The rules are used to factor each source case into the individual steps that were applied within the case, through a process of rational reconstruction. The individual steps are then su ciently ne-grained that the relevant ones can be transferred verbatim from source to target, despite overall disparities between the cases. Factoring is thu s a w ay of adapting the source case to enable transfer to globally dissimilar target cases.
To test the architecture for a real-world task, it was applied to the problem of name pronunciation. With minimal knowledge engineering, the resulting system, Anapron 1 , w as found to perform almost at the level of the best commercial name-pronunciation systems, and substantially better than other machine-learning systems applied to this task two v ersions of NETtalk. Moreover, Anapron's accuracy was found to exceed what it could have a c hieved with rules or cases alone, thus demonstrating the accuracy improvement a orded by combining rule-based and case-based reasoning.
Figure 1: Anatomy of the architecture. The black outer rectangle represents the overall architecture for combining RBR and CBR; the gray inner rectangle encloses the core method. Boxes represent modules of the architecture, and icons stand for knowledge structures. Links indicate dependencies between components.
Procedure RC-Hybridproblem Until problem is solved do: a RBR: Use the rules to select an operator to apply. b CBR: Look for analogies that contradict the operator suggested by RBR. c Combination: Decide between the operators suggested by RBR and CBR. it did, there would be no reason to apply the architecture in the rst place. In fact, even if the weak theory does not contain the right operator to apply, the architecture may be able to recover by applying Theory Extension, which detects such missing operators by noticing failures of the weak theory to account for examples in the case library, and which i n vents new operators and rules to correct the failures see Section 2.2.2.
As an example of a weak theory, consider a toy v ersion of a problem in auto insurance: to assess the risk of insuring a new client. Solving a problem in this domain consists of three steps: determining whether the client is an attentive driver, determining whether he 2 is in a hostile driving environment, and, based on the previous inferences, assessing his level of risk. Each step is implemented by applying one of a corresponding set of operators. For example, the rst step | determining whether the client, c, is an attentive driver | is implemented by applying either the attentive or inattentive operator. The former adds the assertion attentivec to the state, while the latter adds the opposite assertion. Applicability conditions control the order in which operators are applied; for example, attentive and inattentive are constrained to apply only in the initial state. The weak theory is summarized in Figure 3 .
The next knowledge source needed by the core method is the case library. It is a collection of cases, where a case consists of a problem, its answer, and the chain of operators by which the answer was derived. In the insurance domain, a case translates into a client, the client's level of risk, and the operators that derived that level of risk for that client. The client is represented as a feature vector. Figure 4 gives an example of a problem and two cases in this domain. The full case library in this toy example has 30 cases.
The last two knowledge structures required by the core method are the similarity metric and thresholds. The similarity metric estimates how similar two problems are with respect to the application of a particular operator. The thresholds are used by the combination module in deciding whether an analogy should override the rules. These are both discussed further below.
The individual modules in the core method are presented in the following sections. ;`High' rule elseif inattentivec or endangeredc then medium-risk ;`Medium' rule else low-risk ;`Low' rule Figure 3: Weak theory for the toy auto-insurance example. The less-than signs b e t ween operators represent applicability conditions that control the order in which the operators are applied. The letter c in the rules stands for a client.
Target
Case 1 Figure 4 : A target problem and selected cases from the insurance example. MERL-TR-94-19a 5 December 1995 Procedure Indexcase Until case is solved do:
a Use the rules to predict which operator o p should apply to case. Let r be the rule that made the prediction. b Compare o p with the operator o o that is observed to have been applied to case. c If the two operators are the same, store the case as a positive exemplar of rule r, else as a negative exemplar. d Proceed to apply operator o o to case. Figure 5 : Procedure for indexing a case.
Indexing
The purpose of the indexing module is to organize the cases to make them accessible later for CBR. CBR will use the cases to critique RBR; cases are therefore viewed as evidence for or against the rules. A case constitutes evidence for a rule if it illustrates a place where the rule makes a correct prediction. It constitutes evidence against a rule if it illustrates a place where the rule makes an incorrect prediction. The indexing module stores the case as a positive or negative exemplar of the rule accordingly.
The complete indexing procedure for a case is shown in Figure 5 . It applies RBR to the case as if it were a new problem.
Step c does the actual indexing: it stores the case as a positive o r negative exemplar of each rule that was predicted to apply to it.
Step d completes one iteration of the procedure by applying an operator to the case. It applies o o , the observed operator, so that when the rules make their next prediction in step a, it will be based on how the case was actually solved, not on how the rules would have solved it. Applying the predicted operator, o p , w ould be incorrect, because then if the rules predict one wrong operator at the beginning, all of their subsequent predictions that are based on this initial wrong operator will be thrown o as well.
Once all of the cases have been indexed as described, they can be used as source exemplars for analogies. The indexed cases will also be used to help in judging analogical compellingness see Section 2.1.4.
Given that the rules are not expected to be perfect, one may ask how this indexing scheme performs in the face of rule inaccuracies. Consider the situation where the architecture is presented with a target problem, and the case library contains a source problem that is similar to the target and has the same behavior. Will the indexing scheme be able to retrieve this source? The answer is yes, regardless of rule inaccuracies, as long as the rules re the same way for the source and target problems. This is likely, given that the source and target are similar; the only way for the rules to di erentiate between them is to test a property that is both irrelevant to their behavior and not shared between them. Thus if the rules handle the source correctly, they will le it under the right ` Student' rule`Normal tra c' rule`Medium' rule   ,  ,  , , , , , , , @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @
Positive Negative Johnson
Positive Johnson
Positive Johnson
Negative Negative Figure 6 : Results of applying PBI to client Johnson. Johnson is stored as a positive or negative exemplar of each of the three rules that make a prediction for him.
rules, and retrieve it when these rules re again for the target problem. If the rules handle the source incorrectly, they will le it under the wrong rules, and retrieve it when these same wrong rules re for the target problem. In e ect, the rules act as a hashing function, distributing exemplars into behavior classes based on weak knowledge of the domain. The indexing scheme just presented is termed prediction-based indexing PBI because it indexes cases by the rules that predicted which operators should apply | regardless of whether the predictions were correct. Equivalently, it can be thought of as indexing cases by whatever features the rules looked at in order to make their predictions. This is related to explanation-based indexing EBI Barletta and Mark, 1988 ; h o wever, there the rules are used to explain an observed outcome, rather than to make their own prediction of the outcome. This di erence results in quite distinct modes of operation in the two s c hemes. EBI needs to account for any observed answer, and thus works backward from the answer using correct rule applications. It prefers a theory that is as broad as possible | one that can even account for multiple answers to the same problem rendering the rules nondeterministic. PBI, on the other hand, applies the rules in the forward direction, allowing both correct and incorrect rule applications. It uses the same rules as for ordinary rule-based reasoning, rather than requiring one set for explaining answers and one set for performance. It prefers a theory that is as accurate as possible, to minimize the amount o f w ork the architecture will have to do later to override wrong rule applications via CBR.
Example As an illustration of PBI, consider again the toy auto-insurance example. PBI applies to the rst client in the case library, Johnson, in three iterations. The results are shown in Figure 6 . On the rst iteration, the rules are applied, and the`student' rule res. It predicts the attentive operator for Johnson. This di ers from the operator speci ed in the case, inattentive. Johnson is therefore stored as a negative exemplar of the`student' rule. The indexing procedure proceeds to apply the observed operator, inattentive, to Johnson. On the second iteration, the`normal tra c' rule predicts neutral, which agrees with the operator given in the case. Johnson is made a positive exemplar of the`normal tra c' rule. On the last iteration, the`medium' rule correctly predicts the operator medium-risk, based on the assertions of the previous two operators. Johnson is therefore stored as a positive exemplar of the`medium' rule.
RBR
Rule-based reasoning matches the rules against the target problem. Rules can match a n y attribute of the problem-solving state, including assertions added by previous problem solving. Rule matching corresponds to step a of procedure RC-Hybrid. The matching rule is not actually applied at this point, but rather is taken as a provisional rule that will only be applied later if not overridden by CBR.
Example Continuing with the insurance example, suppose the target problem is to evaluate the risk of insuring client Smith see Figure 4 . On the rst iteration of procedure RC-Hybrid, thè student' rule matches and is selected as the provisional rule.
CBR
The CBR module acts as a critic of the RBR module. It corresponds to step b of procedure RC-Hybrid. It tries to show that the target problem is an exception of the provisional rule by looking for an analogy between the target problem and a negative exemplar of the rule. The negative exemplars of the rule are available in a list hanging o the rule | this was arranged by the indexing scheme. The CBR module goes down this list, proposing analogies one at a time, until it runs out of exemplars, or the combination module judges one of the analogies to be compelling. 3 The actual proposing of analogies is done by applying the similarity metric. The metric takes three arguments: a source problem, a target problem, and an operator to be transferred from source to target. Here the source problem will be a negative exemplar, and the operator-to-be-transferred will be the operator that was applied to this exemplar. The operator establishes a context for comparing the problems. Given these three arguments, the metric returns two v alues: a numerical rating of the similarity, called the similarity score; and the implicit rule behind the analogy, called the analogical rule or arule. The implicit rule that any analogy makes is that a particular set of features that were found to be in common between the source and target problems determines the same outcome for the two problems. Accordingly, the left-hand side of the arule gives the features that were judged by the metric to be shared by the two problems, and the right-hand side gives the operator-to-be-transferred. The arule will be used for judging whether the analogy is compelling see Section 2.1.4. Example Back to the insurance example, the RBR module has just proposed the`student' rule as the provisional rule for Smith. The CBR module attempts to defeat this proposal by likening Smith to previous negative exemplars of the rule. As was shown above, Johnson is one such negative exemplar. The CBR module draws an analogy from Johnson to Smith, with respect to the inattentive operator, by applying the similarity metric. A similarity metric can, in general, be as simple or as complex as desired, ranging from simply counting identical features, to doing a relevance-weighted feature comparison, to applying a full expert system for measuring similarity. F or the insurance domain, a metric at the simple end of the spectrum was chosen: it counts the number of elds that match in the two client structures and it ignores the operator-to-be-transferred. Text elds are considered to match if they are identical. Numeric elds match if the two n umbers fall within the same interval of a prede ned set of intervals. For the analogy from Johnson to Smith, the metric yields the arule:
If address1c = Sigma Chi House and address2c = Stanford, CA and sexc = M and agec 30 and occupationc = student then inattentive. This arule expresses the features shared by Johnson and Smith according to the metric. The metric returns a similarity score of 5, which is the number of elds that match b e t ween Johnson and Smith and hence also the number of conditions in the arule.
Combination
The combination module implements step c of RC-Hybrid: it decides which of the other modules to listen to, RBR or CBR. It does this by e v aluating the analogies proposed by CBR. If it deems one of them to be compelling, then CBR wins; else RBR wins. Decisions of compellingness are based in part on the similarity score of the analogy. The similarity score is the degree to which the source and target problems match on relevant attributes, and thus the degree to which the problems are expected to have the same answer, according to the similarity metric. Because the metric is only a heuristic, however, the combination module does not rely on it exclusively; it also subjects the analogy to an empirical veri cation. This is a test of how w ell the arule | the generalization behind the analogy | works for other exemplars in the case library. The test returns two results: the arule's accuracy, that is, the proportion of exemplars it got right; and the signi cance of the accuracy rating, which i s 1 m i n us the probability of getting that high an accuracy merely by c hance. The calculation of these results is explained in more detail below.
Compellingness can now be expressed essentially as a conjunction of the two factors discussed above: the analogy must have a high similarity score, and it must perform well in the empirical veri cation. The conjunction enables more robust judgements of compellingness. An analogy between two apparently similar problems will be rejected if the similarity turns out not to be predictive for other examples; and an analogy that works by spurious coincidence on the available examples will be rejected if there is not also a plausible similarity b e t ween its source and target. The compellingness of an analogy A is de ned more precisely as follows:
Compelling-pA similarity-scoreA SS 0 and accuracyA A 0 and signi canceA S 0 or similarity-scoreA SS + where SS 0 , SS + , A 0 , and S 0 are thresholds for deciding when a value is high enough; they can be provided from the outside, or set by the Threshold Setting module Section 2.2.3. This de nition requires the analogy to be strong on all parameters | the score assigned by the similarity metric, and the accuracy and signi cance from the empirical veri cation. However, an escape clause | the disjunct involving SS + | provides a way of accepting analogies between overwhelmingly similar problems, even if there are not enough data for a signi cant accuracy reading. The calculation of the accuracy and signi cance of an analogy will now be explained in more detail. The rst observation is that the arule may be viewed as a specialization | in particular, an exception class | of the provisional rule. It follows that the arule applies only to a subset of the exemplars both negative and positive of the provisional rule. It does not apply to the rest of the exemplars in the case library. When the arule does apply to an exemplar, it will suggest the application of the operator o on its right-hand side. This operator may o r m a y not agree with the operator that is observed to have been applied to the exemplar. Several de nitions can now b e made:
Let m = n umber of exemplars that the arule applies to and that were observed to have had operator o applied n = total number of exemplars that the arule applies to M = n umber of exemplars of the provisional rule that were observed to have had operator o applied N = total number of exemplars of the provisional rule. The accuracy of the arule is then given by m=n. As mentioned above, the signi cance is one minus the probability, p, of getting that high an accuracy merely by c hance. In calculating p, a slight correction is needed. The probability of getting m out of n exemplars right is in uenced by the fact that the arule was constructed to be right for one of the exemplars | namely, the source case for the analogy. The calculation of p therefore pretends that this source case does not exist; it uses m 0 = m , 1 and n 0 = n , 1 in place of m and n. With this in mind, p can be calculated using . 4 Also, as mentioned earlier, the similarity score of the analogy is 5. The thresholds in this domain were set to the values SS 0 = 4 , SS + = 6 , A 0 = 0.66, and S 0 = 0.50 see Section 2.2.3. Thus the analogy is deemed compelling. The upshot is that Smith is determined to be inattentive, by analogy to a similar inattentive student from the same fraternity. Assuming that no compelling analogies are found in the balance of the problem solving, Smith will ultimately be assessed as medium risk, rather than low risk as the rules alone would have predicted.
The support modules
The knowledge structures required by the core method may not be readily available in all domains. The role of the support modules is to help construct these knowledge structures. Each of the three support modules deals with a particular issue in the construction. The rst, Rational Reconstruction, deals with the issue that while a set of problem answer pairs may b e a vailable for the domain, the path by which each answer was derived may not be | but these paths are needed by the core method as part of the case library. Rational Reconstruction uses the weak theory to infer the path of operators leading from each problem to its answer. The second support module, Theory Extension, deals with the issue that the weak theory may have gaps that prevent the abovementioned reconstructions from going through. When such a gap is exposed, Theory Extension proposes plausible new operators or rules to add to the weak theory to bridge the gap.
The third support module, Threshold Setting, deals with the issue that there may not be predened values to use for the four thresholds in the de nition of analogical compellingness. Threshold Setting chooses values via a learning procedure that generates training examples for itself from the case library.
The support modules e ectively reduce the knowledge requirements of the architecture to three: a w eak theory, a set of problem answer pairs, and a similarity metric. Rational Reconstruction and Theory Extension have hooks to incorporate supplemental domain knowledge if desired, as discussed below. The following sections brie y describe the three support modules. A more complete description can be found in Golding 1991 .
Rational reconstruction
Examples of problems and their answers are available in many domains | spellings and their phonetic transcriptions in pronunciation, patients and their diagnoses in medicine, theorems and their proofs in mathematics, etc. What tends to be not so widely available is the chain of reasoning by which each answer was derived | experts have trouble articulating how they pronounced a name, or arrived at a particular diagnosis, or came up with a proof. Unfortunately, without this information, an answer is of rather limited use; it can only be applied to new problems in toto. Any system that wants to transfer just part of the answer to a new problem needs some way of breaking down the answer into individual steps. The Rational Reconstruction module RR provides a way of doing this. Given a problem and an answer | and using a weak theory of the domain | RR infers an operator sequence that leads from the problem to the answer.
Rational reconstruction can be viewed as a problem of search for an operator sequence. The operators in the sequence are drawn from a weak theory of the domain. The sequence must satisfy two constraints. First, it must account for the given problem and answer:
Validity: The operator sequence, when applied to the problem, must produce the answer. It may happen that no operator sequence satis es the validity constraint; this signals that the weak theory is missing one or more operators. In this case, RR calls Theory Extension to ll the gap. The opposite problem is when there are multiple valid operator sequences. Here, RR invokes the rules of the weak theory as a bias: it prefers the operator sequence that is closest to what the rules would have predicted. The idea is that even though the rules are not perfect, they are good enough to steer RR toward plausible derivations. This is expressed in a second constraint:
Minimality: The operator sequence must deviate minimally from the sequence predicted by the rules of the weak theory. This brings up a second opportunity for patching the weak theory: if RR cannot nd a valid operator sequence with zero deviation, this means that the rules do not predict a valid operator sequence for the problem at issue. In such cases, RR may call Theory Extension to alter the rules such that they do predict a valid operator sequence. This option is rarely invoked, however; the primary approach of the architecture is not to x imperfect rules, but to supplement them with CBR.
The two constraints above lead to two strategies for RR: the validity-rst strategy, which generates valid operator sequences and selects the one with minimal deviation; and the minimality-rst strategy, which generates operator sequences in order of increasing deviation, and selects the rst valid one. The deviation of an operator sequence is the sum of the deviations of each of its operators, where a deviation metric measures the deviation of an operator. The default metric scores 0 if the operator agrees with the one predicted by the rules, and 1 otherwise. The scoring can be made more sophisticated by including domain-speci c knowledge that penalizes deviations according to their severity. The validity-rst and minimality-rst strategies, and combinations thereof, de ne a space of possible strategies for doing RR. The particular strategy that is best for a given domain depends o n a n umber of factors, including the accuracy of the rules in the domain. Pruning and ordering heuristics may be used in conjunction with either strategy to speed it up.
A couple of observations about RR can be made at this point. The rst is that RR can be regarded as doing a form of credit assignment. In particular, suppose that RR is given a problem answer pair that has several valid reconstructions, each of which violates a di erent rule. Then RR, in choosing among these reconstructions, is implicitly doing credit assignment, as it is deciding which rule violations hold. Moreover, it is doing the credit assignment b y i n voking a minimality bias | it selects the reconstruction with the smallest total deviation from the rules. Put another way, i t assigns credit so as to minimize the total amount of blame.
The second observation concerns RR's e ectiveness as a function of the directness of the operators in the weak theory. A direct operator a ects the nal answer of a problem by directly altering some part of it. An indirect operator does not manipulate the answer itself, but rather a ects the choice of other operators. Indirect operators tend to be harder to reconstruct, because they are relatively unconstrained by the answer. RR must therefore rely more on its minimality bias in reconstructing them. This can be dangerous, as the minimality bias is only as accurate as the rules of the weak theory. By and large, therefore, the more direct the operators in the weak theory are, the more e ective RR will be.
There is a variety o f w ork related to RR, including learning apprentices, plan recognizers, studentmodelling systems, and story-understanding systems. These systems all infer some kind of trace of the reasoning behind an agent's observed behavior. Such systems typically enforce the validity constraint; that is, they produce traces that are consistent with the observed behavior. The differences among systems lie in the bias they use for choosing among the valid traces. One simple bias is to return the rst valid trace found; this is the approach taken in PAM Wilensky, 1983 , a story-understanding system. A widely-used bias is to prefer the simplest valid trace | i.e., the one that makes the fewest assumptions | as in, for example, the plan-recognition work of Kautz and Allen 1986 . The ACCEL system Ng and Mooney, 1994 , which has also been used for plan recognition, instead prefers the most coherent trace. CELIA Redmond, 1992 , a learning apprentice in the domain of automotive repair, prefers the valid trace that is thought to best capture the hierarchical goal structure underlying the linear sequence of the expert's actions. Other systems adopt the same bias as RR: they prefer the valid trace that is closest to what a theory would have predicted. Such systems can be classi ed according to where they fall in the space of strategies described above for RR. For instance, the BUGGY student-modelling system Brown and Burton, 1978 uses a minimality-rst strategy to infer a model of how a student does arithmetic.
Example The toy insurance domain, as usual, will furnish an illustration of RR. A pure validityrst strategy will be used, with no pruning or ordering heuristics. Consider the reconstruction of the operator sequence for client Johnson see Figure 4 . The validity-rst strategy rst generates all valid operator sequences that account for the answer of medium risk: 1 attentive, endangered, medium-risk 2 attentive, neutral, medium-risk 3 inattentive, endangered, medium-risk 4 inattentive, neutral, medium-risk.
The deviation of each sequence is then measured. Operators that are found to disagree with the ones predicted by the rules have been marked above with an asterisk . If the default deviation metric is used, then sequences 1, 2, and 4 tie for rst place with a score of 1.0; the choice among them can only be made arbitrarily. H o wever, the deviation metric that was actually used for this toy domain treats violations of the`student' rule as less serious than other violations. Thus operator sequence 4 wins, as re ected in the reconstruction information shown in Figure 4.
Theory extension
In the process of reconstructing how an observed answer was derived, RR is bound to turn up inadequacies of the weak theory. In such cases, the Theory Extension module TE is invoked to patch the weak theory appropriately. The general problem of theory repair is quite di cult. Wilkins 1988, ch.4 gives a good overview of various techniques that have been tried; there has been subsequent w ork under the rubric of abduction Morris and O'Rorke, 1990, for example . Because the general problem is so hard, TE takes a restricted approach to theory repair. It is geared to the two particular situations in which T E i s i n voked by RR.
The rst situation is when RR cannot nd a valid operator sequence for a given problem answer pair. Viewing reconstruction as a search task, this means there was no complete path from the start state containing the problem to the goal state containing the answer. TE tries to complete the path by proposing new operators to bridge gaps between previously-unconnected states. In general, there will be multiple sets of operators that will do this. TE selects the minimal set, where minimality is de ned by a cost metric. The cost metric typically uses domain-speci c knowledge to evaluate the cost of inventing a new operator between a given pair of states.
The second situation in which T E m a y b e i n voked is when RR cannot nd a valid operator sequence that has zero deviation from the rules. This presents an opportunity to alter the rules to bring their prediction into agreement with one of the valid operator sequences. However, TE will only attempt this under very constrained circumstances. In particular, if it is known that a certain class of rules in the domain ts a particular template, then TE can try proposing a new rule by instantiating the template for the current problem. If this improves the deviation score of the best valid operator sequence, then the new rule may b e w orth adding to the theory.
In the existing implementation, TE requests user approval before actually making any of its proposed changes. This provides a sanity c heck on whether the extensions appear to be reasonable.
Example RR was able to reconstruct the 30 cases in the case library for the toy insurance domain without recourse to TE. For illustrative purposes, however, RR was run on a couple of additional examples and forced to call TE. In the rst of these examples, client D a vis see Figure 4 was modi ed to have an answer of negligibleDavis. RR could not nd any operator sequence to explain this answer, and so it called TE. RR's search space is shown in Figure 7 . State s 0 is the start state, containing the information initially known about the case: nameDavis = Davis, address1Davis = T oyon Hall, and so on. State s f is the nal state, containing the answer negligibleDavis. Arcs represent operator applications; for instance, an arc leaving state s 0 applies the attentive operator, resulting in a state s 1 containing the new assertion attentiveDavis. In the gure, the attentive arc and resulting state s 1 have been collapsed with the arc and resulting state for its sibling operator, inattentive. This collapsing was done throughout the diagram to hide distinctions irrelevant t o theory extension.
RR's inability to reconstruct Davis can be seen from the unreachability of the nal state s f from the initial state s 0 . TE's job is to x this by adding one or more new operators. Four operators are considered, G0001 through G0004, shown by the gray arcs in the gure. To c hoose among these, TE applies a cost metric for the insurance domain. The metric is based on the number of inferences in a state, where an inference is an assertion added by an operator. The initial state has 0 inferences. State s 2 has 2 inferences, because two assertions are needed to reach it; e.g., attentiveDavis and neutralDavis. State s f has 3 inferences, because other nal states in this domain have 3 inferences, and the number of inferences is taken to be a constant across nal states. The metric then de nes the cost of an operator to be the number of inferences it is implicitly making by going from one state to another. For instance, the cost of G0002 is 2, because it goes from a state with 1 inference to a state with 3 inferences. If an operator implicitly makes zero or a negative n umber of inferences, it is considered nonsensical, and is assigned an in nite cost. The e ect of this metric is to connect the initial and nal states using existing operators to account for as many inferences as possible, and new operators for as few as possible. This is a rudimentary example of how a cost metric can guide TE toward minimal extensions of the theory. By the metric, operators G0001 through G0004 have costs 3, 2, 1, and in nity, respectively; hence TE prefers G0003. This enables RR to infer the operator sequence attentive, neutral, G0003 for Davis.
As an example of TE for rules, consider the rational reconstruction of client Johnson. As mentioned above, Johnson has four valid operator sequences: When this rule is inserted into the weak theory, it brings sequence 1 above i n to complete agreement with the rules | i.e., it gives it a deviation of zero. This is an improvement from the previous best deviation, which w as for sequence 4, and was non-zero. TE therefore proposes this new rule as a possible extension to the theory. 5
Threshold setting
The Threshold Setting module Tset provides a principled way o f c hoosing values for the thresholds of the core method. The thresholds are used in determining when an analogy is compelling. The de nition of compellingness is repeated here for convenience:
Compelling-pA similarity-scoreA SS 0 and accuracyA A 0 and signi canceA S 0 or similarity-scoreA SS +
The point of compellingness is to enable the architecture to decide when it should listen to an analogy | i.e., when the analogy is right and the rules are wrong. The goal of Tset, consequently, i s t o pick v alues for the thresholds that will result in analogies being classi ed as compelling whenever they would correct wrong answers of the rules. Tset takes a machine-learning approach: it generates training analogies, and tries to pick the thresholds so as to do the right thing for these training analogies | that is, it should accept analogies that correct wrong answers of the rules, and, conversely, it should reject analogies that spoil right answers of the rules. The approach is semi-automatic in that the user has the nal say of what values to pick, based on Tset's recommendations. Tset generates its training analogies from the case library. It pretends that each exemplar in the case library in turn is a target problem, and it nds all analogies to it from other exemplars. A training analogy is classi ed as helpful if it suggests the right operator for a target problem where the rules would have suggested the wrong operator. An analogy is harmful if it suggests the wrong operator for a problem where the rules would have suggested the right operator. Tset's task may n o w be framed as one of selecting threshold values that minimize the number of misclassi ed analogies, where misclassi ed analogies are the helpful ones that are judged uncompelling plus the harmful ones that are judged compelling.
While Tset could, in principle, search the 4-dimensional space of threshold settings for the one that minimizes the number of misclassi ed analogies, this turns out to be quite costly in practice. Instead of trying to set all 4 thresholds simultaneously, therefore, Tset sets them one at a time. This gives up the guarantee of nding the global minimum in exchange for tractable run time. The threshold-setting procedure has three steps. On the rst step, Tset temporarily adopts a simpli ed de nition of compellingness:
This de nition requires setting only one threshold, SS 0 , to minimize the number of misclassi ed analogies. Figure 8 shows what prototypical distributions of helpful, harmful, and misclassi ed analogies would look like at this stage of the processing. The value of SS 0 that minimizes the number of misclassi ed analogies is also shown. Tset does not choose this value automatically, however, but rather displays the distributions to the user and lets him make the nal decision. The SS + threshold is also set at this point, the natural choice being a value just high enough to exclude all harmful analogies. Once a value of SS 0 is selected, all training analogies whose similarity scores fall below this value can be discarded; they have already been classi ed as uncompelling, and so o er no information about how to set the rest of the thresholds. Each subsequent step of the threshold-setting procedure therefore has fewer training analogies to process | only the ones that are left unclassi ed by the previous steps. This makes the subsequent steps faster to run, although it also makes their conclusions less reliable due to the smaller number of examples on which they are based.
The second and third steps of the threshold-setting procedure set the A 0 and S 0 thresholds, respectively. These steps are similar to the rst except that there is no analog to SS + . Each step adopts a temporary de nition of compellingness, adding one more conjunct of the true de nition. At the end of the third step, all four thresholds | SS 0 , SS + , A 0 , and S 0 | will have been set. Example Tset was used to set the thresholds for the insurance problem. The results appear in Figure 9 . The distributions of analogies are shown for each of the three steps of the procedure. These curves do not quite have the ideal shape depicted in Figure 8 , being based on only 30 cases, the number available for the insurance problem. The threshold values that were selected for this task were SS 0 = 4 :0, SS + = 6 :0, A 0 = 0 :66, and S 0 = 0 :50. The values for SS 0 , SS + , and A 0 were selected at or near the optimum values. The choice of S 0 was less clear-cut, as the error curve w as largely at between 0.0 and 0.65 this was because it was based on a lopsided 34 helpful analogies and 1 harmful analogy. Its value of 0.50 was chosen somewhat arbitrarily within this range.
Discussion
A n umber of frequently-asked questions" about the design of the architecture are discussed below. They are grouped by whether they concern the combination of RBR and CBR, just RBR, or just CBR.
Combination issues
Why is RBR applied before CBR? Rule-based and case-based reasoning can be combined in three main orders: RBR rst, CBR rst, or some interleaving of the two. The architecture presented here adopts the RBR-rst strategy, using CBR merely to patch errors left by RBR. This strategy is appropriate when the rules are reasonably e cient and accurate to begin with. If the rules are de cient in some way, the CBR-rst strategy may make more sense. If the rules and cases o er more balanced contributions to the problem solving, then an interleaving strategy may be best. Can analogies be drawn from positive exemplars? While the architecture currently draws all of its analogies from negative exemplars, analogies from positive exemplars could also be useful in certain situations. One way to use them would be to decide between RBR and CBR by w eighing the evidence from positive analogies against that from negative analogies. The drawback of this approach, however, is that it relies on the case library to illustrate not only the places where the rules are wrong, but also all situations where they apply correctly. Given that the rules are assumed to be fairly accurate to begin with, this could require a huge number of positive exemplars.
An alternative that relies less on having total analogical coverage of the domain is to use positive analogies to resolve nondeterminism in the rules | places where the rules suggest multiple operators. The operator with the greatest support from positive analogies is then selected. This approach i s less sensitive to gaps in positive c o verage because it compares positive analogies to other positive analogies, not to negative analogies. Gaps in positive c o verage therefore tend to a ect all operators in the comparison equally especially if the evidence for each operator is averaged over a set of positive analogies. Such a s c heme was implemented in Anapron, and is described below see Section 3.3. This use of positive analogies may be regarded as a method for combining rules and cases to make nondeterministic answers unique. By contrast, the architecture presented here is a method for combining rules and cases to make deterministic answers more accurate. The two methods provide orthogonal functionality, and may be used separately or in combination. Anapron is an example of using them in combination.
Could rules and cases be converted into a uniform representation? An alternative t o a truly hybrid system | one that works from multiple representations | is to convert all knowledge sources into a uniform representation, and work from that. Converting between rules and cases tends to be hazardous, however; the conversion tends to yield ine cient or unreliable representations. See also Golding and Rosenbloom 1991 . 
RBR issues
What if the rules are not of an if-then-else form? The architecture assumes that exactly one rule will re in any state to recommend the next operator to apply. This a ords an easy way o f assigning credit to the rules: a rule is held responsible for the operators it recommends. This credit assignment enables the architecture to improve the performance of the rules | it lets it associate past mistakes negative exemplars with particular rules, and later override similar incorrect behaviors by analogy to the past mistakes. In a more distributed, evidence-gathering model of problem solving, such as that of MYCIN Buchanan and Shortli e, 1984 , m ultiple rules can re, and all contribute to each decision that is made. To accommodate such a rule formalism into the architecture, an analogous credit-assignment procedure would be needed | one that would ascribe some proportion of the credit for each decision to each of the rules that contributed to it.
CBR issues
What is the appropriate level of generality for arules? Each time the architecture draws an analogy, it extracts the generalization behind the analogy, and represents it as an explicit rule, the arule. It then uses the arule to do an empirical veri cation of the analogy. This involves trying out the arule on other cases in the case library. The purpose is to see how w ell the generalization holds up for other examples.
An arule is not uniquely determined; the only constraint is that it must be a generalization of the source and target problems. Currently, the architecture makes the arule maximally speci c | it includes in the arule all conditions shared by the source and target according to the similarity metric. The idea is to minimize the inductive leap; this reduces the risk of overgeneralization. However, there is an argument for generalizing more liberally: the more general the arule is, the easier it will be to nd cases in the case library to which the arule applies, and thus the more informed the empirical veri cation will be. Striking an appropriate balance between this greater ease of empirical veri cation and the risk of overgeneralization is an area for future work.
Could the architecture s a ve its arules? Given that the architecture already goes to the trouble of extracting the generalizations behind its analogies as arules, it certainly could store them. Incorporating the arule into the existing rule set is straightforward: the arule represents an exception class of the rule from which it originated. Thus the arule would be stored so as to always override the original rule. If the rules are of an if-then-else form, this means ordering the arule just ahead of the original rule.
Saving arules in this way w ould gradually compile" the cases into rules, thereby shifting the burden of problem solving from CBR to RBR. Whether this should be done is basically a storeversus-compute tradeo . The architecture can store its arules, in which case it saves the time of rederiving the analogies; or it can compute the arules, in which case it saves the storage cost of keeping around all past arules. One could imagine resolving this tradeo in either direction. The decision in the architecture to re-compute, rather than store, was based on the reasoning that, because the arules are constructed to be maximally speci c as discussed above, a policy of storing would end up keeping a large number of rules that hardly ever red; moreover, these rules could easily be rederived if needed.
How does the architecture do case adaptation? Case adaptation is the process of transforming a source case to make it applicable to a disparate target case. Traditional techniques for case adaptation involve retrieving the entire source solution, and doing localized problem solving to patch the parts that are incompatible with the target case. The architecture presented here takes a di erent tack: using RR, it factors the source case into individual operator applications. It then draws analogies from these individual operator applications to the target problem. The individual operator applications are su ciently ne-grained that they can generally be transferred to the target problem verbatim. Thus the architecture employs a strategy of case adaptation by factoring". This strategy is related to the idea of decomposing a source case into smaller parts, or snippets, each o f which addresses one subgoal of the case Can the architecture learn new cases? Classical CBR Riesbeck and Schank, 1989 involves a learning step: after a target case is solved, it is stored back i n to the case library to enrich the system's bank of experience. Such a learning step could be incorporated into the architecture presented here by h a ving the architecture ask, after each problem it solves, whether its solution is correct. If the answer is a rmative, the case may be added to the case library directly. If not, further dialogue would be needed to debug the answer before it is stored away. This procedure is not currently implemented because it would create a need for run-time feedback from the user. However, additional cases can always be added to the case library o -line if desired.
How is noise in the case library handled? The architecture protects itself against inaccurate cases through empirical veri cation. A bad case may lead to a bad analogy being proposed; but the analogy will be rejected unless there is a signi cant n umber of supporting cases. The one exception is if the bad analogy has a high enough similarity score to exceed the SS + threshold; in that event, it will be accepted even without other supporting cases. This is highly unlikely, h o wever, as the SS + threshold should have been set high enough to avoid such spurious analogies.
Anapron
The architecture presented here was applied to name pronunciation, resulting in the Anapron system. Names, because of their varied etymology, are a notorious stumbling block for pronunciation systems; this has made name pronunciation an important problem in text-to-speech synthesis. The domain is well-suited to application of the architecture, as reasonably accurate and e cient rules of pronunciation are known, yet the domain is su ciently complex that perfect rules have never been devised | rules inevitably have exceptions. This suggests application of the architecture presented here. The architecture can take advantage of the existing rules, imperfect though they may be, while also tapping into an alternative knowledge source, namely examples of names and their pronunciations. By assimilating knowledge from both sources, the architecture has the potential to outperform existing systems, which are either rule-based or case-based, but not true hybrids.
The sections below start by i n troducing the domain of name pronunciation. The application of the architecture to this domain is then described; and an additional analogical mechanism is presented that was incorporated to deal with nondeterminism in the rules. The descriptions are at a high level, to give the basic idea of Anapron's operation and a sense of the task of name pronunciation, without getting deep into the intricacies of the domain. For full details, see Golding 1991 .
Name pronunciation
Name pronunciation is a problem of practical interest. It comes up in almost any text-to-speech application, but especially name-intensive applications, such as telephone-based credit validation, voice mail, and generic reverse directory assistance i.e., number to name Vitale, 1989 . The most important property that makes names unique, as compared to regular words, is their varied etymology. Not only must a pronunciation system infer the language of origin of a name, it must then decide how to treat foreign names. Strict adherence to the native pronunciations can come out sounding stilted at best, and unintelligible at worst. What is needed, assuming an American user population, is some appropriately anglicized interpretation of the foreign languages. These etymology-related di culties make names problematic for pronunciation systems. The brute-force solution would be to construct a giant pronouncing dictionary of all names the system is apt to encounter. The problem is that the set of names is in general open-ended. A system reading stories o the AP newswire, for instance, has to contend with a constantly changing set of newsworthy individuals. In the end, one can only expend a nite amount of resources building a name dictionary; pronunciation systems will always have to deal with the problem of unfamiliar names.
Until fairly recently, the solution was simply to pronounce names badly; pronunciation of proper names was acknowledged to be an open problem . In recent y ears, however, a substantial e ort has been devoted to the problem, resulting in several high-quality commercial systems. The predominant approach has been to develop rules tailored speci cally to names, as in, for example, the Orator TM 6 system Spiegel and Macchi, 1990 and DECvoice Vitale, 1991 . While these systems have a c hieved among the best performance yet demonstrated, they have also shown the extreme di culty of writing rules to cover every contingency. No matter how many rules are written, there always seem to be exceptions. This observation is the basis for an alternative approach t o t h e problem, which views name pronunciation more as a huge bag of idiosyncratic behaviors than as a rule-governed process. The approach, embodied in the TTS system Coker et al., 1990 , is essentially case-based, starting from a large dictionary of names and their pronunciations, and pronouncing a new name by retrieving a relevant source name from the dictionary, and performing one of a number of prespeci ed transformations, such as su x exchange e.g., Agnano = Agnelli , elli + ano.
TTS performs well | comparably to the rule-based systems mentioned above | but like those other systems, still leaves room for improvement. The good, but imperfect performance of both the rule-based and case-based approaches to name pronunciation suggests combining the two; however, no previous, practical system has taken a true hybrid approach. Sullivan and Damper 1990 have combined rules and cases in a model of human pronunciation, but their model generates either a pure rule-based or a pure case-based solution | it does not intermix RBR and CBR within a solution as Anapron does. Name pronunciation is de ned here as the task of converting an input spelling, e.g., Keidel, i n to an output pronunciation, e.g., kaydehl rhymes with my bell 7 . The pronunciation is a written speci cation of how to pronounce the name; it could be fed through a speech synthesizer to produce an actual spoken rendition. A pronunciation includes the sequence of phones or sounds in the name, as well as the level of stress to place on each syllable. Here, the phones are kaydehl, while and are stress marks. The says to put secondary stress on kay. The means primary stress on dehl. The notation is taken from DECtalk TM 8 , but is unimportant for purposes of this paper. In Anapron, the task of name pronunciation is divided among six principle modules. Table 1 gives a brief account of what each module does, by w ay of illustration for Keidel. T ranscription and stress assignment are the top-level modules: they contribute to the output pronunciation directly. The other modules are in service of transcription and stress. The language and morphology modules produce nondeterministic answers. Here, the language module generates two possible language classi cations of the name | Generic" or German. This nondeterminism is carried through the other modules until the selection module resolves it by c hoosing the German analysis. The way the selection module makes its choice is discussed below see Section 3.3.
Application of the architecture
The architecture was applied not to the task of name pronunciation as a whole, but to its two top-level subtasks: transcription and stress assignment. This section sketches the application of the architecture to each of these subtasks. The knowledge sources are brie y described, followed by a n illustration of the architecture's operation using them.
The architecture works from three knowledge sources for each task: a weak theory, a set of problem answer pairs, and a similarity metric. The weak theory for transcription was based on the rules of the MITalk text-to-speech system Allen et al., 1987 , a s w ell as introductory grammar texts for French, German, Italian, and Spanish. Each operator in the weak theory says how to map a letter or letter cluster into a string of phones. For instance, the operator c:s says to map the letter c to the sound s, i.e., a soft c, a s i n cent. The basic operation of the theory is then to work through the name, applying operators to transcribe each letter or letter cluster. The rules for choosing which operator to apply can test the letters on either side of the cluster being transcribed, the language of the name, and its morphological structure. For example, one rule recommends the c:s operator if the following letter is i, e, o r y, and the name is of Latinate origin | this is the familiar`c softening' rule. A rule can also test how surrounding letters were transcribed; this imposes the constraint that the surrounding letters be transcribed before the rule at issue is matched. Such constraints restrict the possible orders in which the letters of a name may be processed. Occasionally a circular dependency may arise, in which case a deadlock-resolution strategy is invoked. The weak theory for transcription has a total of 295 operators and 619 rules.
The weak theory for stress assignment is based on MITalk, the grammar texts mentioned above, and the stress theory of Liberman and Prince 1977 . The goal of stress assignment is to assign a level of stress | primary, secondary, or zero i.e., no stress | to each syllable in the name. The weak theory starts by assigning stress to each morpheme in the name individually. This is done in two backward passes of the morpheme: the rst pass makes a binary decision as to whether each syllable has zero or non-zero stress; the second pass re nes these binary stress levels into a proper three-valued stress pattern. The stress patterns for the individual morphemes are then combined into a stress pattern for the whole name, based on imposing a hierarchical structure on the morphemes. The operators of the weak theory provide primitives for implementing the above procedure. For instance, two operators implement the rst backward pass of assigning zero or nonzero stress to each syllable of a morpheme: MSR, which identi es the last syllable with non-zero stress; and propagate, which repeatedly jumps backward to the next syllable with non-zero stress. The rules of the weak theory control which operator is applied and how it is instantiated | e.g., how many syllables the propagate operator should jump back each time. The rules can test the spelling of the name, its language, morphological structure, transcription, and syllable structure. The weak theory for stress has 7 operators not including instantiations thereof and 29 rules.
The second knowledge source of the architecture, the set of problem answer pairs, was derived, in the case of both transcription and stress assignment, from a pronouncing dictionary of 5000 surnames. 9 The dictionary includes the 2500 most frequent names in the US, 1250 sampled randomly from ranks 2500 through 10,000, and 1250 from ranks 10,000 to 60,000. The utility of these last two groups is to illustrate patterns that are important but that may not appear in the very common names.
The similarity metrics used in Anapron are based on broad, approximate knowledge about which factors determine a given aspect of a name's pronunciation. For transcription, there are two factors. First, the letters in the immediate vicinity of the cluster-to-be-transcribed a ect the cluster's pronunciation. This is due to assimilation e ects: while the mouth is pronouncing the cluster, it is anticipating the next sounds, as well as retaining aspects of the previous ones. tor a ecting the transcription of the cluster is the overall shape" of the name | essentially, its pattern of orthographic consonants and vowels. The shape a ects the pronunciation in that it re ects global in uences such as language and morphology. The transcription metric takes the two preceding factors into account b y combining a detailed comparison of the two names immediately around the letter cluster being transcribed with a rough global comparison of the names. The stress metric is analogous to the transcription metric: it does a careful comparison of the two names in the region that is most critical for the particular stress operator at issue, as well as a rough global comparison, to pick up on e ects of language and morphology. More detailed speci cations of the metrics can be found in Golding 1991 . The remainder of this section illustrates how Anapron, given the abovementioned knowledge sources, pronounces names. The illustration will be for the transcription of the Keidel example of Table 1 . Transcription of Keidel is actually performed twice, once assuming the name is Generic, and once assuming it is German. This example is for the German case. As mentioned above, transcription involves applying operators to the name, in some order, to map letter clusters to strings of phones. Anapron selects the operators via the RC-Hybrid procedure. Table 2 summarizes the results, disregarding the order in which the letters are actually processed. For the rst letter of the name, k, RBR is invoked rst, and suggests the k:k operator, which maps the letter k to the phone k as in kite. CBR is then invoked to propose analogies contradicting this choice of operator, but no such analogy is found. The Combination module therefore applies the operator suggested by the rules, k:k. Application of the next two operators in the table, ei:ay and d:d, i s similarly uneventful.
For the e, things get more interesting. The rules suggest e:ey, the default pronunciation of e in German as in Frege. However, CBR nds an analogy from Vogel which suggests the e:eh operator instead. This analogy has a similarity score of 0.73. Empirical veri cation reveals that the generalization behind the analogy | which s a ys to apply e:eh in German names in a particular context | applies to 7 cases in the case library: Edelbrock, Fogel, Geibel, Logel, Schnabel, Speidel, and of course Vogel. A l l 7 h a ve e:eh applied. Thus the accuracy of the analogy is 7=7 = 1 :00. The signi cance works out to be 0.71. The way the thresholds were set, the analogy is deemed compelling. Thus the Combination module selects e:eh, o verriding the rules by the analogy with Vogel. For the nal l of the name, the rules suggest l:l, which again goes unchallenged. Thus the output of the transcription module for the German analysis of Keidel is kaydehl | as opposed to kaydeyl, which is what the rules alone would have said.
Positive analogies
As mentioned above, the language and morphology rules in Anapron return multiple answers, due to the di culty of uniquely analyzing these aspects of a name. This rule nondeterminism is resolved by the selection module, through the method of positive analogies. The idea of the method is to use the positive exemplars in the case base to reinforce correct rule applications, just as negative exemplars were used to detect incorrect rule applications. The method starts with multiple candidate pronunciations of a name, corresponding to the di erent w ays of applying the language and morphology rules. It evaluates each candidate pronunciation by seeing if the operators that were applied in deriving that pronunciation seem to have been applied correctly. It does this by drawing analogies between each operator application in the pronunciation and the positive exemplars of the rule that recommended that operator. The closer the operator application is to a previously-seen, correct application, the more favorable the system's evaluation of that operator will be. Speci cally, the score for an operator is the similarity score of the best analogy found. The overall score for a pronunciation is the average of the scores of its transcription and stress operators. 10 Table 3 shows how positive analogies were used in the Keidel example. Only the analogies for transcription operators are shown. On these, the German analysis outscored the Generic analysis; the same turns out to be true of the overall scores, which i s w h y the German analysis was ultimately selected. The main reason the German analysis did better on transcription operators is that the Generic analysis had little support for its ei:iy operator; Reid was used, but scored poorly due to its global dissimilarity from Keidel. The name Riedel, while valuable elsewhere in the Generic analysis, could not help with ei:iy, because its i and e are in the wrong order. One other point concerns the e:eh operator in the German analysis: this operator was applied by analogy, not by a rule; thus there are no positive exemplars on which to base its score. Instead, the score of such an operator is taken to be the similarity score of the analogy that suggested it | in this case, the Vogel Keidel analogy. 10 In addition, a pronunciation may receive b o n uses or penalties assigned by the rules. The most common type of bonus is when a name contains a pre x or su x characteristic of a particular language. For instance, the name Rochambeau has the characteristic French ending -eau; the French analysis of this name therefore receives a bonus. These rule-based scores complement the analogy-based scores, and enable the system to decide among competing pronunciations of a name even in the absence of a case library, albeit in a less informed way. 
Evaluation
Anapron's performance was evaluated in three phases. The goal of the rst phase was to gain a quantitative understanding of system performance: a pro le was taken of how active each part of the system was in practice, and any deviations from the expected performance were analyzed. The second phase stepped back from this internal analysis of the system and looked at the bottom line": how does the performance of the rule case hybrid approach, as embodied in Anapron, compare to that of other approaches? Commercial systems, other research systems, and humans were included in the comparison. Once the overall performance of Anapron was ascertained, the third phase was to understand how i t a c hieved this performance, by e v aluating the contribution of each of its components. This involved systematically modifying each component, and measuring the impact on system performance. The sections below discuss the three phases.
Exploratory measurements
Exploratory measurements of Anapron were taken to get a quantitative picture of its operation, and to detect any deviations from the expected behavior. Two main ndings emerged: 1 The system found fewer strong analogies for rare names than for common names, although the total number of analogies, strong or weak, remained constant; and 2 The system's criterion for analogical compellingness was too strict. The sections below present the test set that the exploratory measurements were based on, and the measurements that were made, together with the resulting ndings. The measurements are grouped by whether they were purely objective, or included a subjective component.
Test set
The test set for this and the other experiments was drawn from the Donnelley corpus, a database of over 1.5 million distinct surnames covering 72 million households in the US. Names in Donnelley range from extremely common e.g., Smith, which occurs in over 670,000 households to extremely rare e.g., Bourimavong, which occurs in 1 household. The number of households that have a particular name will be referred to as the frequency of occurrence of the name.
Test sets were constructed from Donnelley by selecting points of interest along the frequency spectrum, and randomly sampling an appropriate number of names at each point. If Donnelley had fewer than the desired number of names at some frequency f, then the names were selected randomly from the narrowest symmetric frequency band around f that was big enough. The test set for the objective measurements contains 13 exponentially-distributed frequencies: 1, 2, 4, 8, : : : , 4096. The frequencies were distributed exponentially because this yields evenly-spaced measurements of Anapron's behavior | this was determined in a pilot study, which showed that Anapron's percentage of acceptable pronunciations drops linearly as frequency is decreased exponentially. The test set has a total of 10,000 names, with between 250 and 1000 at each frequency. These numbers represent a tradeo between the cost of running the test, and the size of the con dence intervals in the resulting measurements. The names were chosen to be disjoint from Anapron's dictionary, since names pronounceable by rote lookup are unrepresentative of system behavior.
Objective measurements
Objective measurements were made for both the rule-based and case-based parts of the system. The rule-based measurements counted how many operators were applied by each module | language, morphology, transcription, syllable structure, and stress assignment. The case-based measurements counted how many analogies were proposed, accepted, and rejected, and for what reason, where the reason corresponds to the way the analogy satis ed or failed to satisfy the compellingness predicate. All measurements were broken down by name frequency, to see how the system's behavior changes as the names get rarer and thus more di cult to pronounce.
The main nding from the objective measurements was an e ect termed the analogical decline. It says that as name frequency decreases, the number of highly plausible analogies to the name decreases, where a highly plausible analogy is one with a very high similarity score this notion will be made more precise below. Figure 10 shows the transcription data on which the analogical decline is based. It plots the number of transcription analogies as a function of name frequency. I t is split into two graphs | one for accepted analogies, and one for rejected analogies. The accepted analogies in turn are broken down into two reasons for acceptance, denoted signi cant, and highly plausible. These correspond to which of the two disjuncts the analogy satis es in the last clause of the de nition of compellingness. 11 The de nition of compellingness is repeated here for convenience:
Compelling-pA similarity-scoreA SS 0 and accuracyA A 0 and signi canceA S 0 or similarity-scoreA SS + 11 Analogies matching both disjuncts are counted as highly plausible | this re ects the system's processing of such analogies. After looking at their similarity score and accuracy, the system declares them compelling for reason of high plausibility. It has no reason to check further whether they are also signi cant. Each of the four curves plots the number of analogies that were accepted or rejected for a particular reason. The number of names at each frequency has been scaled to 1000.
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Since highly plausible analogies match the last disjunct of this de nition, they can now be seen to be those compelling analogies whose similarity score is SS + or greater. Rejected analogies, like the accepted analogies, are broken down into two groups, this time for the two reasons for rejection: inaccurate, and unsupported. These correspond to whether the analogy failed to satisfy the second or third conjunct of compellingness. 12 To test for upward or downward trends in these curves, a Spearman rank-correlation test Daniel, 1990 was run on each. The results were that the curve of highly plausible analogies was found to decrease pr s 0:01, pD 0:01, but no other signi cant trend was found. This means that the system found fewer highly plausible analogies for rare names. Note, however, that this does not mean that case-based reasoning is useless for rare names | it is merely less e ective at nding highly plausible analogies. In fact, the number of normal plausibility" analogies does not decrease signi cantly, as demonstrated by the absence of a decreasing trend in the curve o f signi cant analogies, which counts all accepted analogies other than highly plausible ones. A further investigation of the analogical decline can be found in Golding 1991 . 
Subjective measurements
Subjective measurements of the system's behavior were made not on the 10,000-name test set described above, but on a scaled-down 1,000-name version. This was necessary to make it feasible 12 Analogies that fail to satisfy both conjuncts are counted as inaccurate, again because this can be determined from the similarity score and accuracy, without having to test whether they are unsupported. Also, there is technically a third reason for rejection, implausible, for analogies that have a similarity score less than SS 0 , and thus fail to satisfy the rst conjunct of compellingness. Most implausible analogies are never generated by Anapron; the system has been optimized to not retrieve the very distant analogs that would give rise to such analogies. Consequently, implausible analogies cannot be accurately counted, and are omitted from Figure 10 .
to obtain human judgements. The 1,000-name test set had 250 names at each of four roughly exponentially-distributed frequencies: 1, 32, 256, and 2048.
The subjective measurements consisted of judgements, for each name, about the acceptability o f the following: the overall pronunciation, the individual transcription and stress operators applied, the choice of language morphology analysis, and the analogies proposed whether accepted or rejected. The judgements were made by the rst author. To facilitate this rather laborious process, a judgement editor was used, which provided a graphical user interface for entering or changing judgements about a name. The editor also veri ed that the judgements for a name were complete and consistent.
The main result of the subjective measurements was that errors of analogical omission helpful analogies that were missed were found to greatly outnumber errors of analogical commission harmful analogies drawn. This suggests that the system's analogical compellingness criterion may have been too strict. This could be xed by l o wering the system's thresholds 13 , thereby relaxing the compellingness criterion, or by re-working the similarity metrics to allow better discrimination between good and bad analogies.
System comparison
In the second phase of the evaluation, Anapron was compared with a variety of other namepronunciation systems to see how the performance of the rule case hybrid method compares with that of alternative approaches. Seven other systems were used in the comparison: three state-ofthe-art commercial systems, two v ersions of a machine-learning system NETtalk, and two h umans. The commercial systems are the same ones mentioned earlier see the beginning of Section 3: the Orator TM system from Bellcore and DECvoice from DEC, both of which are rule-based, and TTS from Bell Labs, which is case-based. The two v ersions of NETtalk are BP-legal, which is the vanilla version of NETtalk Sejnowski and Rosenberg, 1987 , and BP-block, which is NETtalk enhanced with a block-decoding postprocessor Dietterich et al., 1990 . The sections below s k etch the test set, design, and results of the experiment. A more complete presentation can be found in Golding and Rosenbloom 1993 . 
Test set
The test set for the system comparison was similar to that used in the subjective measurements, except that: 1 only 100 names not 250 were chosen at each frequency, to reduce the burden on the human test subjects; and 2 the test set was no longer constrained to be disjoint from Anapron's dictionary, a s a n u n biased measurement of system performance includes names both in and out of the dictionary.
Design
Because there is no objective criterion of correctness for name pronunciations, a pronunciation was evaluated by asking human test subjects whether they found it acceptable. Each system was run on the 400-name test set described above. The output of the computer systems was collected in the form of written pronunciations; the output of the human pronouncers was tape-recorded and transcribed as written pronunciations. The two v ersions of NETtalk were trained on Anapron's 5000-name pronouncing dictionary.
A cassette tape was made of the pronunciations generated by all systems. This involved, for each name, eliminating duplicate pronunciations, and permuting the remaining pronunciations randomly. The order of names in the test set was permuted randomly as well. To hide the identities of the systems, all pronunciations were read by the DECtalk speech synthesizer. A panel of 14 human test subjects listened to the cassette tape and rated the acceptability of each pronunciation.
Results
The main results of the system comparison appear in Figure 11 . The names of the commercial systems and humans have been omitted as their identities are not relevant here. The gure gives the percentage of acceptable scores, out of a total of 5600, awarded to each system 5600 = 14 judges 400 pronunciations. The scores are broken down by name frequency. The gure includes an imaginary ninth system, labelled Ubound, which generates for each name the pronunciation that received the greatest number of acceptable votes from the judges. It measures the degree to which all judges can be pleased simultaneously, using just the pronunciations available from the eight systems tested. Figure 11 shows that Anapron performs almost at the level of the commercial systems, and substantially better than the two v ersions of NETtalk. Also, although the eight systems seem to hit a performance asymptote at 93, the Ubound system demonstrates that it is possible to score at least 97. This suggests that there is room for improvement in all systems.
To detect whether the di erences between Anapron and the other systems were statistically signi cant, an ANOVA w as run, followed up by a Bonferroni multiple comparison procedure. The results are shown in Figure 11 as annotations on the scores in the table. Overall, Anapron outperformed the two v ersions of NETtalk, but the commercial systems, humans, and Ubound did better than Anapron. However, in some frequency ranges, a signi cant di erence between Anapron and certain commercial systems could not be detected.
Given that Anapron is able to exploit two knowledge sources, while the other computer systems use just one, it may be surprising that Anapron did not outperform the commercial systems. It should be borne in mind, however, that Anapron's knowledge sources were put together as rapidly as possible from whatever rules and cases could be obtained | basically the MITalk rules and a 5,000name pronouncing dictionary. The commercial systems, in contrast, use extremely high-quality, and unfortunately proprietary, knowledge sources | carefully-tuned rule sets for the rule-based systems, and a dictionary of over 40,000 names for the case-based system. Anapron was in fact found to improve on the performance of its rules or cases alone see Section 4.3; it would appear, however, that in the system comparison, this improvement w as outweighed by the mediocre quality of the rules and cases used. Thus while Anapron provides a proof of concept of the architecture | a demonstration that combining rules and cases improves performance | actually using this improvement to outperform commercial systems must wait until such time as commercial-quality knowledge sources can be obtained for testing.
Modi cation studies
To gauge the contribution of Anapron's components to its overall performance, a set of experiments was performed in which v arious components were modi ed, and the e ects on system performance were observed. Five such studies were run, modifying: rules and cases, thresholds, language knowledge, morphology knowledge, and syllable-structure knowledge. The rst study | on rules and cases | directly investigated the e ects of combining rule-based and case-based reasoning. It provided the key result that the system achieved higher accuracy by combining rules and cases than it could have a c hieved with either one alone. The threshold study tested how sensitive the system's performance was to the threshold settings used in the de nition of analogical compellingness | i.e., SS 0 , SS + , A 0 , and S 0 . Extreme raising or lowering of any one threshold was generally found to hurt accuracy, although lowering SS 0 sometimes improved accuracy at the expense of increasing run time. The remaining three studies concerned the system's support knowledge | i.e., knowledge needed in support of the two top-level tasks, transcription and stress. Degrading the language or morphology knowledge su ciently was found to have a substantial negative impact on system accuracy, while degrading syllable-structure knowledge had a relatively minor e ect. These studies are described more fully in Golding 1991 . The rule case modi cation study Golding and Rosenbloom, 1991 is the subject of the rest of this section. The test set, design, and results are discussed below.
Test set
Like the system comparison, the rule case experiment required a great deal of human e ort in the evaluation. The test set was therefore made the same size as in the system comparison | 100 names at each of four frequencies. The only di erence was that, as in the exploratory measurements, the test set was constrained to be disjoint from Anapron's dictionary, since again rote lookup behaviors were not of interest.
Design
The rule case study involved independently varying the strength of the system's rules and cases. For each combination of rule strength and case strength, the system was run on the 400-name test set, and its accuracy and run time were recorded. Accuracy was measured as the proportion of acceptable pronunciations generated by the system, where acceptability w as judged by the rst author. 14 All judgements were cached and re-used if a pronunciation recurred, to help enforce consistency across trials. Run time was the average time, in seconds, for the system to pronounce a name in the test set. The system, written in CommonLisp, was run on a Texas Instruments Microexplorer with 8M memory.
The rules were set to four di erent strengths: 0, 1 3, 2 3, and 1. A strength of 1 means all transcription and stress rules were retained in the system. Strength 0 means that all rules were deleted except default rules. The default rules transcribe a letter or assign stress if no other more speci c rule matches. The default rules cannot be deleted, otherwise the system would be unable to generate a complete pronunciation for some names. Retaining the default rules corresponds to keeping 137 of the 619 transcription rules and 16 of the 29 stress rules. Rule strengths between 0 and 1 correspond to retaining a proportional number of non-default rules in the system. Each strength is obtained by deleting a random subset of the non-default rules from the next higher strength.
The cases were set to six strengths: 0, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, and 5000. The strength is just the number of names that were kept in the case library. Again, each w eakening of the case library produces an arbitrary subset of the previous case library.
Rule
Case strength 1000 strength 0 1 2 3 4 5 Figure 12 : System accuracy, shown as a table and as a 3D graph. Each v alue is the percentage of names in the test set for which the system produced an acceptable pronunciation. Figure 12 shows system accuracy as a function of both rule strength and case strength. The main result is that accuracy improves monotonically as rule or case strength increases. The total improvement in accuracy due to adding rules is between 32 and 38 of the test set depending on case strength. For cases it is between 12 and 17 depending on rule strength. This shows that rules and cases each contribute to the system's overall accuracy. It is only by h a ving both knowledge sources that the system is able to achieve its best performance. Figure 13 gives the results on run time. The interesting point here is that when the case library is large, adding rules to the system actually decreases run time. For example, with the case library at size 5000, increasing the rules from strength 0 to 1 lowers run time from 10.2 to 7.2 seconds per name. The reason is that adding rules to the system improves the overall accuracy of the rules, barring sociopathic e ects. When the rules are more accurate, they will have fewer exceptions. This translates into fewer negative exemplars, and thus fewer opportunities to draw analogies. The foregone analogies result in a corresponding savings in run time. In short, adding rules to the system reduces the load on the CBR component. This demonstrates that RBR and CBR do not merely exist side by side in the architecture; they interact bene cially.
Accuracy results

Run-time results
Related work
A n umber of other methods have been proposed for combining RBR and CBR. Each method is designed around a particular set of knowledge requirements; for instance, some methods expect independent rules and cases, while others start with just one knowledge source and derive the other from it. Methods also di er in their approach t o i n tegrating rules and cases; some focus on how and when RBR and CBR can each be pro tably invoked, while others concentrate on how to reconcile Each v alue is the average time in seconds for the system to pronounce a name in the test set.
con icting results of RBR and CBR. Figure 14 organizes the methods into a hierarchy according to these di erences.
The rst branching point tests whether the rules and cases used by the method are dependent or independent. If the rules and cases are dependent, it means that one was derived from the other. Such methods are labelled as e ciency-improving; their primary motivation is to express their knowledge in whatever form will make problem solving most e cient. The methods with independent rules and cases are labelled as accuracy-improving; the primary motivation here is to maximize problem-solving accuracy by exploiting multiple knowledge sources.
The e ciency-improving methods can be further broken down according to which of their knowledge sources was derived from which. Most CBR systems that include a rule component h a ve cases that are derived from their rules. The cases are records of how the rules were applied to particular examples encountered previously. By reasoning from cases, the systems bypass the potentially lengthy process of solving a new problem from scratch via the rules. For example, CASEY Koton, 1988 works in the domain of heart-failure diagnosis. It has a complete but slow set of rules | in the form of a causal model | for diagnosing heart failures. When given a new case to diagnose, it tries to relate the case to a similar case diagnosed previously. When it can nd such a case, its answer usually agrees with what the causal model would have said, but is obtained an average of two orders of magnitude faster. PRODIGY ANALOGY Veloso, 1992 can be regarded as a general architecture for combining RBR and CBR to improve e ciency. P R ODIGY ANALOGY's equivalent of rule-based reasoning is problem solving via search; its version of case-based reasoning is derivational analogy Carbonell, 1986 . The systems whose rules are derived from their cases extract the rules by some generalization procedure. The systems must still keep the cases around, because their rules do not encode all of the knowledge in the cases. The rules in these systems can serve v arious purposes, such as enabling a more compact representation of the data, as in Quinlan and Rivest 1989 , o systems fall into two groups. The rst group emphasizes how and when to invoke the RBR and CBR components; the second group emphasizes how t o combine the results once the components have been invoked.
Systems that emphasize invocation include CABARET Rissland and Skalak, 1991 , GREBE Branting, 1991 , IKBALS II Vossos et al., 1991 , and FRANK Rissland et al., 1993 . These systems are designed to gather evidence to support a user's position. CABARET, GREBE, and IKBALS II work in the domain of legal reasoning, nding support for one side or the other in a legal case. FRANK has been applied to the task of diagnosing back injuries, and generates medical reports re ecting the user's expository goals e.g., downplay the seriousness of the injury; or give a balanced account of the evidence. Because these systems are not intended to make an actual decision about whether the user's position is right or wrong, they do not have to resolve con icts between RBR and CBR; they merely report all of the evidence. The e ort in these systems therefore goes not into combining the results of RBR and CBR, but into determining when RBR and CBR can each be pro tably invoked to contribute to the target problem. CABARET uses a set of heuristics for this purpose, such as If a rule res with an undesired conclusion, invoke CBR to nd cases that discredit the rule". GREBE uses a control strategy that calls on CBR to operationalize abstract rule antecedents, and calls on RBR to establish and elaborate matches between a source and target case. IKBALS II starts with the rules, only invoking CBR when it encounters an open-textured term that cannot be interpreted by further rule chaining. FRANK uses blackboard-based opportunistic control to select the most appropriate reasoning method to apply to a particular subgoal.
In the second group of systems, the focus is on reconciling the conclusions of RBR and CBR. The reconciliation can be done either by a w eak method | i.e., a general-purpose method that does not require knowledge of the domain | or a knowledge-based method. CELIA Redmond, 1992 and Quinlan's method Quinlan, 1993 are two examples of using a weak method. CELIA is a learning apprentice in the domain of automobile repair. A central part of the system's function as a learning apprentice is to watch an expert mechanic and predict the expert's next step. Prediction is done using two knowledge sources: abstract general knowledge, and cases. The abstract general knowledge is that of a novice mechanic, and is thus assumed incomplete and buggy. The cases, in contrast, represent actual troubleshooting sequences by an expert, and are considered highly reliable. To predict the expert's next step, CELIA applies its buggy model, and, independently, looks for an analogous case on which to base its prediction. If it is able to come up with a prediction based on a case, it listens to it, else it falls back on the rule-based prediction. This illustrates a way o f integrating abstract general knowledge and cases under the assumption of incomplete, buggy general knowledge. It is a weak method because it does not use domain knowledge to decide between rules and cases, but rather simply prefers cases whenever they are applicable.
Quinlan's method Quinlan, 1993 applies to tasks whose answer is a numeric quantity. It uses an instance-based scheme to generate an initial answer; this step corresponds to CBR. The simplest instance-based scheme is to retrieve the source case that is closest by some metric to the target, and just copy its answer. Quinlan's method improves on this answer by using a model, M, to add a correction term; this step corresponds to RBR. Let: T = the target problem S = the source case retrieved by the instance-based scheme AS = the answer given by the source case MT = the answer obtained by applying the model to the target MS = the answer obtained by applying the model to the source The pure instance-based scheme would give the answer AS. But Quinlan's combined method gives AS + MT , MS. The parenthesized correction term helps account for di erences between the source and target problems. This answer is thus obtained numerically from the results of RBR and CBR; no domain knowledge is needed.
Systems that take a knowledge-based approach t o c o m bining the results of RBR and CBR include Anapron, MARS Dutta and Bonissone, 1990 , and DANIEL Br uninghaus, 1994 . The main distinction among these systems is in the type of knowledge they use to do the combination. MARS combines evidence from multiple rules and cases using possibilistic reasoning. This requires that all of its knowledge be represented as possibilistic rules; thus MARS's rst step is to convert its cases into this form. The conversion requires certain knowledge about each case: the features of the case that are relevant to its outcome, and the necessity and su ciency with which this outcome is implied. This per-case knowledge enables MARS to represent each case as a rule and subsequently aggregate evidence from rules and cases via possibilistic reasoning. In MARS's domain of mergers and acquisitions, the per-case knowledge is acquired via natural-language processing of a document that explains the judge's ruling on each case.
DANIEL combines CBR and RBR for legal interpretation. DANIEL explicitly addresses con icts between rules and cases by i n voking a rule-based c oordination component. This component decides between CBR and RBR using two sources: domain meta-knowledge | in particular, the legal binding force of the rule-based and case-based arguments, and the degree of open-texturedness of the predicates involved | and the similarity b e t ween the source and target cases.
In Anapron, decisions between RBR and CBR are based on the compellingness of the analogy. Compellingness depends on two factors: the similarity b e t ween source and target, and an empirical veri cation, which tests the generalization behind the analogy on other cases in the case library.
It can be seen that MARS, DANIEL, and Anapron each depend on di erent kinds of knowledge to arbitrate between RBR and CBR. The systems are therefore applicable in di erent situations: when it is practical to do the knowledge engineering of cases that MARS requires, MARS is appropriate. When domain meta-knowledge is available for evaluating the strength of a case-based or rule-based argument, and when it is practical to specify a similarity metric, DANIEL is appropriate. When a large supply of cases is available for testing out an analogy, and again when a similarity metric can be speci ed, Anapron is appropriate.
Conclusion
An architecture was presented for improving system accuracy by bringing together knowledge in two forms: rules and cases. The architecture is intended for domains that are understood well but not perfectly. The idea is that in such domains, expert knowledge in the form of rules can be used to provide a skeletal method for solving problems; cases are then used to esh out the method by covering idiosyncrasies and special cases that were not anticipated by the rules. In addition to a reasonably accurate and e cient set of rules to serve as a starting point for problem solving, the architecture also needs knowledge in support of CBR | namely, a set of cases and a similarity metric. The set of cases should be extensive enough to illustrate the errors in the rules; any unillustrated problems cannot be corrected.
The architecture was applied to the task of name pronunciation. With minimal knowledge engineering, it was found to perform almost at the level of state-of-the-art commercial systems. More importantly, a modi cation experiment showed that its performance was higher than what it could have a c hieved with its rules or cases alone. This demonstrates the capacity of the architecture to improve upon a pure rule-based or case-based system. In addition to the accuracy bene ts, having rules together with the cases allowed two innovations in CBR technology: rst, the rules provided a natural way to index the cases prediction-based indexing; and second, they provided a method of doing case adaptation, termed case adaptation by factoring".
The architecture presented here is one datapoint in a hierarchy of possible hybrid approaches. One way to abstract away from its design is to keep the same reasoning components RBR and CBR, but to combine them di erently. The method of combination could be tailored to whatever knowledge is available in the domain, whether analytic e.g., heuristics about when to believe RBR versus CBR or empirical e.g., examples of previous decisions combining RBR and CBR. Another way to abstract away from the architecture is to replace its RBR component with some other reasoning method. CBR then becomes a postprocessor to improve an approximate answer obtained by a n y method of choice. The downside, however, is that the bene ts of having rules together with cases would be lost | alternative methods of case indexing and case adaptation would be needed. A nal level of abstraction, and the one that is in fact the essence of the work presented here, is simply to combine multiple independent knowledge sources to achieve higher accuracy.
